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With a Little Help from my Spouse: The Role of Trust in Family Business 1
Martin Abraham
Abstract
Empirically, self-employed persons often operate with the support of their partners or other household members as
co-workers in the firm. The formal or informal employment of the marriage partner in particular seems to have a lot
of advantages, such as fiscal benefits and low wage costs. But from a theoretical point of view, these advantages are
jeopardized by serious cooperation problems: If the spouse of the self-employed decides to work in the jointly-run
business, former qualifications are lost. Hence a one-sided dependence on the part of the co-working spouse arises,
which increases with the amount of relation-specific investments. Hence the actors are confronted with a coopera-
tion problem, because the decision for co-working requires trust concerning the future action of the self-employed.
Within this framework, this paper is focused on the determinants which influence the decisions concerning
collaborating in the business of a self employed life’s companion as well as the extent of labor provided in the case
of co-working. It can be assumed that the three types of determinants investigated in this paper affect the assignment
of a spouse or cohabitation partner in the business of a self-employment person: (1) economic determinants which
are individual productivity and human capital of the life’s companion, (2) the situation of the family and the
household, and (3) characteristics of the entrepreneur and the firm. Based on a sample of self-employed empirical
analysis indicates that trust and specialization play a crucial role in explaining co-working of the life’s companions
of self-employed persons. However, economic determinants like productivity and human capital do not show the
expected effects on collaboration.
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1 Introduction
In most modern industrial societies, the number of self-employed persons steadily decreased
until the 70s, when self-employment rates became stable at a low level. Since then, self-employ-
ment rates have shown a small increase but also a high turnover in and out of self-employment
(Aronson 1991, Arum 1997, Luber and Gangl 1997). This development also lead to an increas-
ing interest in the analysis of small and medium-sized firms which were identified as a major
source of jobs and economic dynamics in general (see. e.g. Granovetter 1984, Birch 1987).
Consequently, most research focused on the determinants for the emergence and the success of
new firms and self-employment (see e.g. Kalleberg and Leicht 1991, Preisendörfer and Voss
1990, Bednarzik 2000, Brüderl and Preisendörfer 2000, Earle and Sakova 2000). 
One result of these studies about small and medium sized firms was the importance of the family
for those entrepreneurs (e.g. Light and Karageorgis 1994, Loscocco 1997, Brüderl and
Preisendörfer 1997). The social support by family members seems to be a key resource espe-
cially when the access to capital is restricted. It is often argued that co-working of household
members can lead to economic advantages because of low labor costs and fiscal benefits. Hence,
the collaboration of family members is assumed to be a beneficial strategy for the self-employed
and their relatives. Consequently, the role of the family for business owners was stressed
especially in research on immigrant entrepreneurship (see e.g. Light and Bhachu 1993, Portes
and Zhou 1996, Sanders and Nee 1996, Loscocco 1997, Portes, Haller and Guarnizo 2002).
Moreover, there is increasing evidence for the general relevance of the “private embeddedness”
of self-employment in a family network (e.g. Baines, Wheelock and Abrams 1997, Brüderl and
Preisendörfer 1997, Laferrère and McEntee 1999).
Although these studies highlight the importance of the family for self-employment, we know
next to nothing about the family of entrepreneurs, the problems and advantages of being in-
volved in a family business, and the strategies to cope with this situation. Mostly, it is taken for
granted that the spouse or other family members decide to support the activities of the entrepre-
neur e.g. by co-working in the family business. This may be no problem when the actors have no
other options due to restricted labor market access and low family income like e.g. most immi-
grant family members (e.g. Sanders and Nee 1996). However, in general there are other options
like being employed by another employer. So the question arises under which conditions actors
prefer to work in the business of a family member. Moreover, the decision to join or to found a
family business leads to severe problems of cooperation and allocation: Who will have to do
which tasks? How to split work effort as well as business revenues? What will happen in case of
a divorce? It becomes evident that running a joint family business requires some safeguards in
order to solve these problems. 
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2 Due to the fact that the empirical analysis is restricted to female companions, the feminine pronouns for the
companion and masculine ones for the entrepreneur are used. However, in principal the theoretical approach developed in this
section could be applied also to female entrepreneurs.
3 The term „family business“ is used in this paper as a synonym for the firm of the self-employed person.
In search for answers to these questions, this paper focuses on the relationship between an
entrepreneur and his spouse or cohabitation partner. I will refer to these married or non-married
partners of entrepreneurs as “(life’s) companions” and their marriage or cohabitation as “private
relationship” in the following.2 In general, these co-working women have three options which
can be mixed in all possible combinations: They can devote their time to their family and the
household, they can work in the family business or they can look for an employment in the labor
market. In this situation, the women are confronted with different problems. Especially when a
well-educated woman works in her partner's business, she gives up the high income she could
earn outside a jointly-run family business. Moreover, she runs the risk of losing her occupational
training in the long run, if her occupation in the market does not fit the qualifications necessary
for the family business.3 This situation becomes problematic for the spouse of a self-employed
and, more seriously, for people living in cohabitation. If the companion must invest in special
skills to collaborate in the business of the entrepreneur and her previous occupational training
cannot be used, she will decide to work inside the firm only if she expects the private relation-
ship to last. However, a glance at the high divorce rates in western societies is evidence for the
fact that emotional relationships can no longer be relied on exclusively to develop stable long-
term partnerships (England and Farkas 1986: 59). 
Within this framework, the determinants which influence the decisions for collaborating in the
partner‘s business are examined as well as the extent of labor provided by the companion in the
case of co-working. In this paper three types of determinants are investigated which can be
assumed to affect the assignment of a life’s companion in the business of a self-employed
person: (1) determinants concerning the private partnership, the household and the family, (2)
economic determinants of individual productivity and human capital of the companion, (3)
characteristics of the family business.  Within this framework, a special focus lies on problems
of trust and stability concerning the private relationship between the entrepreneur and the
companion.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In the second chapter the theoretical background will be
outlined and hypotheses are developed. Therefore, the economic motives of co-working and trust
problems within the firm of the entrepreneur are discussed. Then the role of the family and the
private partnership for co-working will be highlighted. The third chapter introduces empirical
data and describes the variables and methods. In the fourth chapter, some descriptive findings
and the results concerning the hypotheses are presented. The final chapter contains a short
summary and a discussion of the results.
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4 See, for example, Abraham (1996) for employment relationships,  Blumberg (1997) and  Batenburg (1995) for
industrial cooperations, and Giesen (1994) for households. Moreover see  Raub & Weesie (1996) for further details and
research projects.
2 Determinants for co-working of companions
Due to our research questions, the theoretical analysis focuses on the dyad of the entrepreneur
and his partner. In this dyadic relationship, the actors usually have common interests, e.g., a
good education for the children or a high household income, as well as some conflicting interests
like the distribution of household labor. It is assumed that each individual actor decides inten-
tionally on the use of his or her resources. As Raub and Weesie (1993: 7)  pointed out, the
partners are confronted with two basic problems: First, who will contribute which resources to
the relationship and how will the obtained benefits be distributed (problem of allocation), and
second, how can the actors ensure that the relevant explicit or implicit agreements will be kept
(problem of cooperation). To solve the problem of cooperation, the actors need mechanisms to
prevent opportunistic behavior by the partner. Usually, a combination of mechanisms will be
used; this can be called “governance structure” (Williamson 1983; Williamson 1985, Pollack
1985, Raub and Weesie 1993: 16). Governance structures can include all types of commitments
like formal contracts, informal agreements, or investments that are lost in the case of opportunis-
tic behavior.
For many types of dyadic relationships, the cooperation and allocation problems as well as the
governance structures used by the actors have already been analyzed empirically.4 However, it
is argued here that the private relationships of entrepreneurs and their companions are a special
type of match which differs from other dyadic relationships. Contrary to purely private marriage
relationships or typical employment contracts, the actors examined could be seen as simulta-
neously embedded in two different functional settings: In their respective private household on
the one hand and in the business of the entrepreneur on the other.
Multi-person households as the first functional setting are prototypes of long-term relationships
based on the division of labor. Private households can be defined as socio-economic units on the
basis of a common residence (Blau, Ferber and Winkler 2001: 6). The formation of multi-person
households is usually explained by economies of scale, that is advantages resulting from pooling
individual resources for collective use (Becker 1991). Within one of the most famous theories
concerning households, the new home economics (e.g. Becker 1991; Berk and Berk 1983, Ierulli
and Tommasi 1995), problems of cooperation and allocation do not play a major role.  House-
holds and families are seen as small production units which optimize one joint utility function.
Individual interests were therefore neglected which lead to a variety of criticism (see e.g. Berk
1980, Ben-Porath 1982, England and Budig 1998) and to new models which explicitly acknowl-
edged the role of interest conflicts in households and marriage relationships (e.g. England and
Farkas 1986, Bergstrom 1989, Ott 1992). This paper is based on the idea, that the actors are able
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5 Although this term focuses on the character of network relationships, it is not the aim of this paper to analyze private
or business networks of the actors. However, if the family in the household is interpreted as a special type of network, the
similarity to the idea of multiplex relationships within the network approach becomes evident. For more details on multiplex
networks see e.g. Knoke and Kuklinski (1982: 15-16).
to solve these problems of cooperation and allocation by using so-called commitments. These
commitments restrict opportunities for opportunism and create therefore trust between the
partners (e.g. Raub and Weesie 1993, Kalmijn and Bernasco 2000). Such commitments can be
institutionalized e.g. by marriage or marriage contracts, but more often they are implicit invest-
ments like children or joint property. The decisions of the entrepreneur’s companion concerning
these commitments will not only be influenced by the expected characteristics of the marriage or
cohabitation relationship within the household but also by the second functional setting, the
business of the self-employed partner.
In contrast to employed persons, the entrepreneur is confronted with several problems concern-
ing the management of his business. Especially in the case that he is not able to perform all
necessary tasks without additional manpower, he has to hire employees. Hence, so-called
principal-agent-relations are established (see, e.g., Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985), which are
characterized by specific problems like the sufficient monitoring of the agent by the principal.
Within this context, the entrepreneur has the possibility of relying on his life’s companion’s
manpower. However, it will be shown that the collaboration of the latter will create cooperation
problems of its own. Again, these problems will have to be solved by appropriate commitments
and the creation of trust concerning the future of these arrangements. 
Hence, this paper focuses on so-called multiplex relationships, which are characterized by two
or more different types of transactions between the same interaction partners.5 Within this
framework, it will be tried to specify factors influencing the decision of the companion for co-
working. Therefore, the companion’s economic motives in terms of income possibilities are
highlighted. Moreover, it will be shown that the multiplex character of the match facilitates the
management of intra-firm trust problems on the one hand but causes certain problems of trust in
the case of co-working on the other. The theoretical framework used in this paper stresses the
governance mechanisms which are able to solve the basic problem of cooperation between the
self-employed and his companion and therefore make co-working based on specific investments
in human capital possible. Beside the basic decision to work in the companion’s business, the
amount of time provided will be investigated. Based on the same theoretical framework, the
family situation is supposed to play a key role for the explanation of this factor. Note that the
existence of a private partnership as well as the self-employment of one of the partners is treated
as given and will not be explained within this framework.
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6 Consider e.g. a surgeon who can realize a high income in a hospital due to her special occupational training while
her abilities will have no relevant impact on her relatively low productivity in the firm of a handicrafts person.
2.1 Economic Motives of Co-Working
Co-working in the companion’s business can be seen as a special type of labor force participa-
tion. Hence it seems to be plausible to start any explanation with a general microeconomic
concept which is based on the individual productivity. Actors who offer their manpower in the
labor market will gain monetary assessable returns for the labor applied. This income depends
on, among other factors,  their respective abilities, called human capital (Stinchcombe 1990,
Becker 1993), and the characteristics of a particular position like the equipment provided by the
firm. Standard labor market theory now assumes that actors will try to maximize their income by
choosing the best placement offered. 
From this point of view, the companion compares the job in the business of her partner with jobs
offered in the external labor market and chooses the one which provides the higher income. To
analyze this decision, the internal productivity of the companion in the firm of her partner and
her external productivity in the labor market are distinguished. Although both will be determined
by the general human capital of the actor, they are not identical.6 Consequently the first hypothe-
sis (H1 ) predicts that ceteris paribus life’s companions who are able to earn high incomes in the
outside labor market work (a) less likely and/or (b) fewer hours inside the firm of the self-
employed. On the other hand, companions work (a) less likely and/or (b) fewer hours inside the
firm of the self-employed if they have a high internal productivity (H2 ).
Whether the manpower of the companion is to be employed in the entrepreneur’s business or in
the external labor market, therefore strongly depends on the extent and the nature of the compan-
ion’s acquired human capital. Without additional assumptions this must also be true for life’s
companions managing the common household. With respect to Becker’s theory of comparative
advantages, one person at the most will employ time in both the market and the household
(Becker 1981: 17). Due to the specific knowledge of the entrepreneur, he only works in his own
business. Hence the companion either has to split up her efforts between the business and the
household or will only specialize in household labor.
However, this microeconomic argumentation is based on the assumption that a perfect labor
market exists. In such a perfect labor market, there is neither unemployment nor a necessity to
accept a job which does not meet one’s qualifications. Such an environment implies that an actor
would get a job which is rewarded on the basis of her or his individual productivity. Obviously,
labor markets empirically are not perfect in this sense. Due to this fact, it is necessary to consider
the opportunity structure the actors are confronted with. Only if companions with a high external
productivity have a chance to get a job which meets their requirements, we will be able to
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observe the correlations stated by hypothesis H1. However, it can be argued that empirically
labor markets are not perfect: First, imperfect mobility makes it sometimes hard to find a job
which is rewarded high enough. Second, due to the fact that the companions are most often
responsible for the common household, there is a need for part-time jobs with high flexibility.
However, such a kind of job is difficult to find. Taken together, the individual productivity will
only have an effect on co-working if the actors have the opportunity to find an adequate  job.
Unfortunately, it will not be possible to test this assumption with the data used in this paper.
What can be done is to examine the effect of an external job - full or part-time - which is
supposed to reduce not only the probability of co-working but the extent of collaboration as well
(H3 ).
Although individual economic motives seem to be a powerful tool for analyzing labor market
processes, they are not always the most important determinants for the decision which job to
take. It is argued here that there are two other crucial factors which determine co-working. The
first one results from the organizational setting in which the match between the self-employed
person and his life’s companion is embedded in. As it will be argued in the next section, the
existence of trust-problems in the firm of the self-employed will also influence the decision for
co-working. The second determinant - which will be discussed in the last section of this chapter -
is based on the well-known fact that labor force participation is strongly influenced by the family
situation of the actors. 
2.2 Problems of Monitoring and Co-Working
As outlined in the first section, the self-employed person is usually confronted with a so-called
principal-agent situation; his employees are working as agents in his firm. In this relationship,
“one individual has the responsibility for taking decisions supposedly in the interests of one or
more others, in return for some kind of payment” (Rees 1985: 3). The interaction structure of all
principal-agent-relations involves basic problems of cooperation or trust (Pratt and Zeckhauser
1985). Most of these problems arise when the principal is not able to observe and supervise the
actions of an agent completely. This is a basic problem of employment relationships and is
emphasized in the so-called shirking literature: According to this approach, “each worker
undoubtedly has some maximum level of productivity that he can bring to the workplace, but
depending on motivation, he can also provide his employer any productivity between his
maximum and nothing” (Thurow 1983: 201). Shirking refers to the case that the employee
provides a productivity below the one that had been implicitly agreed upon at the beginning of
the employment relationship. Employees generally are interested in shirking since they can
thereby reduce their working efforts and possibly can gain leisure time. Employers are hardly
ever able to identify this shirking ex post without doubt. The more difficult the ex post monitor-
ing of an employee or the measurement of his output is, the bigger is the scope of the employee
and the more difficult it is to overcome this clash of interests between principal and agent (see
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e.g. Arrow 1985, Miller 1992). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) even argued that the existence of
the capitalist entrepreneur (and thus of the firm too) can be explained by this sort of argumenta-
tion. The main characteristic of an entrepreneur is to monitor the members of a production team
in order to solve cooperation problems and to avoid shirking of group members. However,
because team members have to be monitored while doing their job, employers are rarely able to
supervise their employees completely. Especially if the work tasks or the firm itself become
more complex they have to rely on additional mechanisms like supervising managers or  incen-
tive pay.
Looking at the collaboration of the companion from this point of view, an important advantage
of such an assignment becomes obvious (see especially Pollack 1985). Since both partners have
considerable interdependencies in their benefits in the household (e.g., common interests or
altruism), the agent’s incentive for shirking is small. Loafing in the entrepreneur’s business
results in smaller returns, with the surplus ideally being identical with the common household
income. In addition, a relationship of trust already exists in the private relationship between the
life’s companions that does not need to be implemented under costs and with the help of third
parties. As a matter of principle, the collaboration in the common business results in advantages
compared to a pure employer-employee-relation in two ways: First, the life’s companion can be
assigned for special tasks, for example, in situations where a lot of cash is transferred and an
employee cannot be monitored, assignment of the companion is beneficial. Second, the compan-
ion can be assigned for monitoring other employees, for example in situations when the self-
employed person is on the move. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis (H4 ): The
more problems concerning monitoring and trustworthiness of employees exists in the family
business, the more likely/ the more hours the companion should work inside the firm. Hence the
decision for co-working will be determined not alone by the human capital of the companion but
also by the social capital: as Coleman pointed out, obligations which are created by trustworthi-
ness of interaction partners can be interpreted as one source of social capital (Coleman 1990:
306). In this sense, the multiplex character of the relationship allows for the transformation of
social capital into economic capital. But this only holds true if there is a stable match between
the self-employed and his companion. In the next chapter, we will focus on this problem of
creating obligations and expectations in a long-term relationship.
2.3 The Problem of Specific Investments and the Private Embeddedness of the Match
The match between the self-employed person and his companion is certainly not only embedded
in the organizational structure of the business but also in a private structure. This structure
includes partnership arrangements, family characteristics and household structure. As we will
see in this section, this private embeddedness can lead to new trust problems on the one hand but
may also help to solve these kinds of problems on the other hand.
With a Little Help from my Spouse Martin Abraham 10
Co-working in the partner’s business can solve monitoring problems, but new questions espe-
cially for the collaborating partner also may arise. This becomes obvious when the collaborating
partner has educational qualifications that cannot be used in the common business. The compan-
ion’s investments in her occupational training are lost and the acquired knowledge becomes
obsolete quickly and cannot be used anymore in the future. Besides, other formal and informal
qualifications and abilities have to be acquired  for the new job in the entrepreneur’s business.
Again, this qualification is connected to additional costs. Because every employment relies on
informal knowledge concerning the firm, the internal procedures, and information channels
(Williamson, Wachter and Harris 1975), collaborating will always lead to a certain amount of
such specific investments. Moreover, there are opportunity costs from resigning one’s old
occupation which could be interpreted as another form of specific investment: The companion
becomes dependent on the income and the business of her partner. Based on this kind of human
capital argumentation, hypothesis (H5 ) can be derived: The higher the sunk costs due to former,
not usable occupational investments are the lower the probability of co-working will be. How-
ever, such sunk costs are not supposed to affect the extent of co-working in the case that a
companion decided to work in the partner‘s business.
The depreciation of the old investments in education and the new investments in occupational
training thus can be viewed as specific investments in the private relationship of the partners.
They are lost as soon as this relationship and, with it, the collaboration in the common business
are terminated. So a new problem of trust arises: Though the collaboration of the companion
would be economically efficient, it will only be realized when the investing actor can trust in a
stable private relationship in the future. One possibility to solve this problem is to use a contract
which contains commitments to stay within the match. However, such a contract is only possible
if there is an ‘institutional embeddedness’ (see Raub and Weesie 1993: 24ff) of the match. In the
case considered in this paper, the private as well as the commercial partnership are embedded in
an institutional framework which includes legal norms and the possibility of enforcing those as
well as contracts in courts. Concerning the relationship between the self-employed person and
his companion, the institutional embeddedness mainly provides possibilities for formulating
explicit or implicit contractual agreements. As Raub and Weesie point out, the “classical
contract form is marriage” (Raub and Weesie 1993: 37) which provides commitments for the
contract partners not to terminate their match too easily. Moreover, with a marriage contract, the
self-employed is committed to provide for his companion if she does not earn her own income.
In this sense, marriage contracts are used as commitments concerning basic business-related
investments. Due to these commitments, the matching partners can make use of the multiplex
character of their match which leads to hypothesis (H6 ): Married companions will show a higher
probability and a higher extend of co-working than unmarried companions.
Contractual agreements are not the only commitments for stabilizing the private partnership.
There are also some other factors which increase the cost of termination for the actors like
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common property or extensive private networks shared with the partner. In general, such specific
investments in the private partnership increase the longer this relationship lasts. Hence it is
hypothesized that the longer the duration of the private partnership is, the higher the probability
as well as the extend of co-working will be (H7 ). Beside these general commitments, compan-
ions of self-employed have an additional opportunity to stabilize the partnership by investing in
the firm of the partner. A joint ownership of business will render life after a divorce more
difficult for both sides, moreover it is a financial safeguard for the partner who quits working in
the firm. Consequently it can be expected that (H8) a financial investment in the firm will lead to
a higher probability as well as a higher extend of co-working by the companion. Finally,
commitments do not only result from the private partnership alone. A very important mechanism
is the social control other family members can carry out. E.g. if a separation from a collaborating
partner is interpreted by other family members as dishonest and thus opportunistic behavior, they
can sanction the entrepreneur by withdrawing support for his business or the household. Hence
the social embeddedness in family network fosters the emergence and the assertion of norms and
can thus be viewed as social capital which enables cooperative behavior (Coleman 1990).
Consequently, the more an entrepreneur depends on the help of other family members - whether
from his family or from his companion’s - the stronger possible sanctions will be. A companion
will more easily accept the dependence resulting from co-working if a family network restricting
opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneur exitsts. Of course, this disciplining effect will also
work the other way round, that is for possible opportunistic behavior of the companion. Based
on the general concepts of social embeddedness and social capital, hypotheses H9 can be de-
rived: If other family members collaborate in the business of the entrepreneur, there will be a
higher probability as well as a higher extent of co-working.
Concerning the family situation, especially the existence of children can be interpreted as a
commitment (Becker 1981): It is well-known that specifically young children stabilize partner-
ships (e.g. Waite and Lillard 1991, Cherlin 1992). Moreover, the family business provides an
opportunity for flexible working hours which allows to combine child care with a job.  Hence it
could be hypothesized that the existence of children increases the chance and the extend for co-
working. However, concerning the effect of children on co-working an opposite effect exists as
well. Usually, the self-employed partner will specialize completely in his business and will do
even less household labor than employed husbands (see Abraham 2001). Consequently, the
companion will take care of the children and the household. As it can generally be said for all
women, motherhood reduces the general tendency for labor market participation. Whether the
negative or positive effect of children on co-working will be dominant cannot be decided
theoretically. However, the effect of household labor on co-working should be predictable. The
more household labor a companion will have to do, the less time for another job will be left.
Consequently, it can be expected that (H10) the more household and family tasks a companion
provides the lower the probability as well as the extend of co-working will be.
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3 Data and Variables
3.1  Data: Regional Setting and Occupations
Due to the limited availability of empirical data about the research topic, our study has an
explorative character. Especially the necessity to acquire knowledge about the specific occupa-
tional settings of self-employed in all possible occupations prevents us from aiming at a repre-
sentative design. Instead, five distinct occupations of the self-employed were chosen, each with
special characteristics: pharmacists covering the freelance professions, opticians and painters or
varnishers covering craftsmen, and owners of travel agencies and leaseholders of petrol stations
covering commerce. This selection provides a data set which includes information on the
different educational and financial backgrounds of the self-employed and their partners in the
sample. Furthermore an “area study design”7 is used by restricting the survey population to two
German regions around the middle sized cities Nuremberg and Leipzig. Because Nuremberg is
located in the western part of Germany and Leipzig in the eastern part, this design allows also to
examine differences due to the German reunion. In the following the Nuremberg Sample is
called the „West“ and Leipzig data the „East“ sample.8
TABLE 1: Sample characteristics
OCCUPATION
mailed
questionnaires
N   
responses
N
net response
rate
   %
respondents
 with com-
panion
    N
male
respondents
with female
companion
   N
West East All West East All All
opticians 169 47 216 55 14 69 38,4 63 50
travel
 agents
422 --- 422 41 --- 41 9,7 33 23
painters
 /varnishers
686 260 946 108 57 165 17,4 160 156
pharmacists 443 --- 443 145 --- 145 32,7 122 89
leaseholders of 
petrol stations 
297 --- 297 35 --- 35 11,8 33 28
unknown --- --- --- 26 18 44 --- 29 24
Total 2017 307 2324 410 89 499 25,3 440 370
Of the 2.324 self-administered questionnaires sent out, 499 were returned. This is a net response
rate of 25.3%. Since not all of the respondents were living in a marriage or a cohabitation
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companions: 66% in another German study (Brüderl, Preisendörfer and Ziegler 1996: 132), 39% for the Netherlands (Meijer
1985) and about 30 to 40% for France (Laferrère and McEntee 1999).
arrangement, our analysis is based on 440 cases meeting these criteria, with 370 entrepreneurs
being men (see table 1). In our questionnaire we asked for information on the private relation-
ship of the partners, financial aspects like the turnover of the business, and the arrangements of
co-working. The questionnaire consisted of 14 pages with 49 questions. After a short character-
ization of the firm, the second and third part dealt with the private relationship between the
entrepreneur and his companion, the household, and the family background. The fourth part
focused on co-working including the number of hours, legal arrangements, and special invest-
ments. The questionnaire ended with some questions highlighting the companion’s employment
activities outside the firm of the self-employed. 
Although this design makes it possible to combine explorative and quantitative research tech-
niques, a serious methodological problem arises. In our theory, we focus on the match between
the entrepreneur and his companion as the unit of analysis. In practice, we directed the question-
naire to only one side of this match, the entrepreneur. Therefore, we have to assume that the self-
employed in our sample are able to give valid information about all interesting characteristics of
the match. However, the low number of unanswered questions concerning the companion can be
interpreted as a first hint of validity.
3.2 Operationalization and Variables 
For multivariate analysis, three types of variables are available: information on the family
situation and the household, variables on co-working of the female companion, and the charac-
teristics of the male entrepreneur and the firm. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the
variables used in this analysis.
As dependent variable the information on co-working of the companion will be used. Because
it can be assumed, that the decision process of the companion includes at least two steps - the
decision for co-working and the decision on the extent of collaboration - the multivariate
analysis will focus on two different types of information. First, the probability of co-working
will be estimated based on a logistic regression model. With about 71% of the companions
currently or previously co-working, our research project evidently focuses on a key issue of
entrepreneurs and their companions.9 Second, the extent of co-working will be estimated by two
regression models. In this case the dependent variable is operationalized  by the number of hours
per week the companion works in the firm of the entrepreneur. Among those collaborating, 5.4%
work between one and nine hours per week, 11.9% work between 10 and 19 hours, 23.5 work
between 20 and 39 hours, and nearly one fifth of the partners (18.4%) work 40 hours or more in
the business of the self-employed. The mean duration of co-working is 20.5 hours per week.
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10 Considering the extremely long business hours of petrol stations, this large mean seems to be quite plausible.
There is no significant difference among the five occupations selected, except for the leasehold-
ers of petrol stations; they show a mean of 32 hours per week.10
TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Multivariate Analysis
Variable Valid Cases Mean SD
Information on family and household situation
married (0=no, 1=yes) 369 0,90 0,30
existence of partnership contract (0=no, 1=yes) 366 0,26 0,44
duration of private relationship (0 less than 19 years, 1=more) 351 0,55 0,50
existence of children (0=no, 1=yes) 356 0,66 0,48
indicator for extend of household labor (0=low, 1=high) 344 0,91 0,29
Information on co-working of female companions
occupational sunk costs (0=no, 1=yes) 357 0,33 0,47
Internal productivity: wage per hour (German Marks) 287 28,65 9,99
External productivity: wage per month  (German Marks) 331 3388 1226
co-working of companion (0=no, 1=yes) 309 0,71 0,46
hours of co-working per week 309 20,52 19,08
external job of the companion (0=no, 1=yes) 356 0,31 0,46
characteristics of the entrepreneur and the firm
entrepreneur has high education (0=no, 1=yes) 370 0,27 0,44
Age of male entrepreneur (years) 363 47,00 10,04
Location of business in Leipzig (East sample) (0=no, 1=yes) 370 0,20 0,40
female companion holds shares in the firm (0=no, 1=yes) 346 0,14 0,35
Firm size (number of employees) 308 6,7 8,4
Indicator for trust problems in the firm 370 1,16 0,75
co-working of other family members (0=no, 1=yes) 361 0,30 0,46
Type of business 
Travel agency 370 0,06 0,24
Pharmacy 370 0,24 0,43
Petrol station 370 0,08 0,26
Painter/ varnisher 370 0,42 0,49
Optician 370 0,14 0,34
The family and household situation is characterized by the existence of children (66% had at
least one), the duration of the partnership (  =20 years, standard deviation 11.7). For analysis,
the latter variable was dichotomized in partnerships which lasted less than 19 years and those
that lasted longer. The extent of household labor provided by the companion was measured by
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11 This legal default in case of marriage is the community of accrued gain. Other options are the explicit settling of the
community of property and the explicit settling of the separation of property, which is the legal default for partners not married.
Due to considerable costs for a notary in case of a private contract, most partners choose the legal default. However, if spouses
settle on a private marriage contract in our sample, they choose the community of property far more often than the separation
of property.
a Likert scale with four categories. On the basis of this scale, the respondent should estimate to
which extent the companion provides household tasks. For regression analysis this scale was
dichotomized: about 90% reported that their female companions do nearly all of the household
labor. For formal commitments resulting from the private relationship of the partners, we
focused on two variables: marriage and formal partnership contracts. As table 2 shows, 90% of
all respondents are married to their respective partners. However, only 26% have a formal
agreement like a marriage or private partnership contract which modifies the legal default.11
Within our sample, only the owners of travel agencies differ in respect to this general picture.
They are married less often considerably (51%) and they rarely have a private partnership
contract with their companions.
Beside the variable on co-working some more information about the work situation of the
companion was gathered. Sunk costs due to old investments in occupational training were
measured by regarding the question whether the companion started with such a training before
the relationship with the self-employed partner began. One third of the companions started with
an occupation which was not compatible with the business. The internal productivity of the
partner was operationalized by the question: “If you had to replace your life’s companion in your
business with a third person, what would the monthly cost of such a replacement be?”. The
internal productivity per hour then was computed by dividing these costs by the hours worked.
For all companions who did not collaborate, this variable was estimated on the basis of regress-
ing the information of some significant factors like education, occupation or age. The mean
productivity per hour is about 28 German Marks (DM) with a standard deviation of 10 DM.
There is hardly any difference among the five occupations: The lowest mean productivity is
shown by companions of painters with 27.1 DM, whereas companions in pharmacies show the
highest mean with 30.9 DM. For the external productivity the entrepreneurs were asked to rate
their companion’s income realized through external employment, 31% of all companions were
employed externally. It is important to note that all possible combinations of the three options -
household labor, internal co-working, external job - occurred. Again, we estimated the hypothet-
ical external income of those partners who were not employed outside the family business via
regression. Companions in the sample yield an average wage of about 3400 DM per month. Due
to the higher education of pharmacists’ companions, this group shows a significantly higher
external productivity as the rest of our sample.
As a third type of variables, the questionnaire included a variety of information on the entrepre-
neur and his business. Apart from the standard variables - like age, education, firm size and type
of business - the project focused especially on the relationship between family and business.
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30% of the entrepreneurs employed members of their own family or those of the companion’s.
Somewhat surprising is the fact, that despite high rates of co-working only 14% of the compan-
ions show a financial partnership concerning the firm of their spouse or cohabitation partner.
Finally, problems of trust and monitoring concerning employees in the firm were measured by
an indicator comprising four Likert-type scales. Based on a scale of four categories the respon-
dent was asked to rate the necessity for permanent monitoring of employees, the importance of
personal contacts with clients, the extent of payment with cash and the difficulty to monitor his
workers. For the trust indicator, the most affirmative category was counted. On the resulting
scale from 0 to 4, the sample shows a mean of 1.16.
4 Empirical Results
In this chapter, empirical evidence concerning the determinants of co-working of the companion
is presented. First, it is analyzed whether the companion is co-working or not. In a second step,
the extent of co-working, that is the hours provided, is analyzed. As previous analysis has
shown, there is a strong effect of gender concerning these dependent variables (Abraham and
Funk 2000). Due to the small number of male companions in the sample, the following analysis
will be restricted to the female companions.
4.1 The Probability of Co-Working
For the question which determinants have effects on the decision whether to work inside the firm
or not, a logistic regression model was used. The dependent variable was coded as one if the
companion showed previously or currently co-working in the firm of her mate; otherwise, the
variable was zero. Theoretically, for the decision where to invest one‘s labor three choices are
available: the companion can work for an external employer, inside the family business or in the
household. However, empirically these three options are not distinct: only about 75% work
either for an external employer or in the family business, and only about 10% concentrate their
efforts exclusively on the household. That means that the majority of female companions are
doing household as well as occupational labor. Due to this data and the small sample size, an
external job as well as household labor are used as dependent variables in logistic regression
model. Model 1 in Table 3 shows the results of multiple logistic regressions by  reporting the
odd ratios (exp b). A coefficient smaller than 1 reveals a negative, one larger than 1 a positive
correlation. 
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TABLE 3: Results of mulitvariate analysis
predicted
correlation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
odd ratios of
logistic
regression
OLS-
regression
Tobit-Regression 
Family and household situation
married + 11,74 * 12,17 ** 20,50 **
partnership contract 0,34 -2,09 -5,85 +
private relationship>19 years + 4,35 * 8,27 ** 6,87 *
existence of children 2,39 1,14 2,38
household labor by companion - 0,64 -9,76 * -11,08 *
household labor by domestic service 1,78 -1,27 -1,17
Work situation of the companion
occupational sunk costs - 5,20 * 2,19 2,15
Internal productivity + 0,97 -0,40 ** -0,36 **
External productivity - 1.00 0,00 0,00
external job of companion - 0,08 ** -15,13 ** -14,88 **
Characteristics of the entrepreneur and
the firm
Age of entrepreneur 0,91 * -0,29 * -0,44 *
entrepreneur has high education 3,01 + 4,11 2,06
Location of business in Leipzig 0,66 2,30 -5,45
companion holds shares + 12,47 * 2,70 7,25 +
Firm size 1,04 0,30 * 0,40 *
Trust problems in the firm + 2,83 * 3,93 ** 5,66 **
co-working of other family members 4,57 * 6,76 ** 8,21 **
Type of business
Travel agency 2,99 9,49 * 12,80 *
Pharmacy 1,80 5,68 + 9,06 *
Petrol station ---- 12,08 ** 16,27 **
Optician 0,82 -0,62 1,82
Constant ---- 31,51 ** 23,21 *
N 164 236 173d)
model fit 0.40a) ** 0.37b) ** 0.09c) **
Annotation: a) Cox & Snell R2 b) adjusted R2, c) Pseudo R2. Levels of significance: ** < 0,01,  * < 0,05,  + <0,1.
Reference group for the occupations are painters/varnishers. d) 44 left-censored cases with no co-working
Concerning the family and household situation, there are two significant results corresponding
with the previous theoretical argumentation. First, in accordance with hypothesis H6, married
companions have a significant higher chance to work inside the family business: compared to
unmarried companions, the relative probability (odds) of co-working increases for married ones
by the factor 11,74.  A formal partnership contract has no effect on the decision of co-working.
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Second, hypothesis H7 can be confirmed: If the couple has been living together for 20 years or
more the odds of co-working increase significantly by the factor 4,35. Although the extent of
household labor shows the expected negative effect on co-working the coefficient is not signifi-
cant and the hypothesis H10 cannot be confirmed in this sample. No significant effects could be
found for the assignment of domestic servants and the existence of children. Note that this holds
true as well concerning the age of children, because very young kids do not influence the
decision for co-working significantly too. This may be due to high flexibility in family busi-
nesses: work hours can be temporarily reduced or children may be supervised during working
hours.
Somewhat surprising are the results on economic determinants which describe the work situation
of the companion. Here hypotheses were derived from labor market and human capital theory.
For this argumentation, it was assumed that the companion will try to maximize the economic
revenues of her work effort. However, this does not seem to be the case: Neither the internal (H2)
nor the external productivity (H3) show a correlation with co-working at all. Also surprising are
the effects of occupational sunk costs (H5). If the life’s companion started with a non-compatible
occupational training before her relationship with the self-employed began, the chance is 5.2
times higher that she works inside the family business. These findings hint that the opportunity
structure concerning the labor market is more important than the productivity characteristics of
the companions. Women with a specific occupational training, especially in the field of handi-
crafts, often get only low paid jobs in the labor market. Hence, those companions have an
incentive to work inside the family business due to bad labor market opportunities. Within this
analysis companions with such a specific occupational training are compared with those who
have no training at all or a general economic occupational training. The latter have good chances
to find attractive jobs on the external labor market, hence their probability of co-working is
lower than those with specific occupational training. Women without any occupational training
often have no strong wish for occupational work, instead they will specialize in household labor.
Taken together, opportunity structures concerning the labor market and specialization in house-
hold labor are more important for the decision to co-work than sunk costs due to occupational
training which is non-compatibel to the family business. Thus the hypotheses on productivity
and occupational sunk costs have to be rejected. Only the - somewhat trivial - correlation, that
a job with another employer decreases the probability of internal co-working, can be observed in
this data set. Hence, the decision for co-working does not seem to be determined by individual
income maximization. 
This leads to other factors, especially to the characteristics of the family business. On the one
hand, more problems of trust in the firm lead to a higher probability of collaboration (H4). This
result indicates that the companions relinquish on individual income in order to safeguard the
success of the family business. On the other hand, the business framework is also used to solve
problems of trust between the partners themselves: As predicted, a financial partnership corre-
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12These are especially Tobit- and Heckman regression models, for an overview see Berk and Ray (1982); Berk (1983);
Winship and Mare (1993) or Breen (1996).
lates with a high probability of co-working (H8). Similarly, the positive effect of other family
members involved in the business is in accordance with prediction H9. Although this may also
be due to the necessity to employ cheap labor, controlling firm size and type of business makes
this interpretation less plausible. Therefore, this correlation should at least partially be based on
the effect developed theoretically above: a strong social embeddedness of financial activities can
be a safeguard against individual opportunism concerning the private relationship of the couple.
Of all control variables included only the age of the firm owner showed a significant effect:
older entrepreneurs employ their wives less likely than younger ones. This should be a partial
effect of early retirement of older women, moreover this results reflects the higher labor partici-
pation of women in younger cohorts. No significant effects could be found for the regional
sample, the firm size and the dummies for occupation of the self-employed.
4.2 The Extent of Co-Working
Whereas the last section dealt with the decision for co-working, this chapter focuses on the
extent of collaboration. First, most of the hypotheses can be tested for the extent of co-working
too. Moreover, there are some hypotheses which only refer to the amount of working hours.
Second, there could be interesting implications for general labor market research. In the regular
labor market, employees usually are restricted concerning the flexibility of labor supply. This is
a problem especially for women with higher occupational qualifications who often are highly
interested in part time jobs. Companions of self-employed persons have the possibility to
balance their family and labor tasks by providing only few hours. With the sample used for this
analysis it is possible to look for determinants of labor supply without the restriction of the
regular labor market.
The analysis of labor supply yields in general a methodological problem well known in labor market analysis (see
e.g. Franz 1985). If the analysis is restricted only to those respondents who work at all, the estimation of the actual
amount of supplied working hours may be distorted. The same is true if those who do not participate in the labor
market are treated as if they had a “zero hour” supply (Berk 1983, Breen 1996). In both cases the real supply can not
be observed e.g. because actors would like to work only five hours a week or only for a higher wage but could not
find a job. For this problem of “sample selection” several models exist which include a correction mechanism for
the expected bias resulting from the censored data.12 For this paper, the classical model proposed by Tobin for the
analysis of censored data like labor supply is used (Tobin 1958). Basically, the model comprises two steps: First, the
probability of labor market participation is estimated, usually by using a Probit Model. Second, the amount of labor
hours is estimated by an OLS-regression which includes a correction parameter resulting from the Probit model.
Intuitively spoken this parameter controls for the decision to work at all. Although this procedure allows to reduce
problems of sample selection at least, there is a severe drawback. In case of small sample sizes the model, which is
based on Maximum-Liklihood estimation, yields not necessarily more efficient results than simple OLS-models.
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Moreover, there may be a problem of multicollinearity due to the fact that the set of variables in the first and the
second step are more or less identical (e.g. Breen 1996: 64-66). Because of these problems two models will be
presented in this paper: First an ordinary OLS-regression which includes the companions not co-working as “zero-
hour” cases and,  second, a Tobit regression model which includes these companions as left censored cases.
Hypotheses will be classified as confirmed only if both models yield significant results. Model 2 in Table 3 displays
the results of the OLS-regression, model 3 those of the Tobit procedure. In both cases the unstandardized coeffi-
cients are shown.
As can be seen easily in table 3, the results of all three models - the OLS- and the Tobit model
as well as logistic regression - match to a high degree. Again, marriage shows the expected
correlation: In the OLS model, married companions work about 12 hours more per week  in the
family business than unmarried ones; within the tobit analysis these are even 20.5 hours. These
results indicate that there is a considerable shift of labor from the external labor market into the
companion’s business after marriage. A private relationship of more than 40 years yields 8
respectively 7 hours more for co-working. Contrary to the decision of collaboration, the share of
household tasks influences the extent of co-working. As predicted by hypothesis H10 more
household labor done by the life’s companion reduces the extent of labor provided for the family
business. Again, a partnership contract, children or domestic servants have no effect on co-
working.
For the extent of co-working the human capital and productivity determinants also show paradox
results. In contrast to these  theoretical arguments, the external productivity (H1)of the compan-
ion has no effect on the hours of co-working. Furthermore, a rising internal productivity (H2)of
the companion decreases her hours of co-working. This may be explained if we assume that
companions will specialize in household labor as far as possible (Becker 1991). Companions
will only collaborate in the firm if there is no affordable substitute for their labor, e.g. because
of internal trust problems. If the amount of labor the companion has to supply for the firm is
fixed, those with an high internal productivity are able to provide the same labor in less time and
can spend more time in the household. However, this kind of ad-hoc argument is not really
satisfying because it implies that the labor in the household has always a higher value than labor
for the firm. This negative effect of internal productivity is a puzzle still to be solved in any case.
Occupational sunk costs  do not influence the extent of co-working. Taken together, the individ-
ual economic determinants do not play a central role for the decision, how many hours  to work
in the business of the self-employed partner.
The last group of variables, that is the characteristics of the entrepreneur and his firm, by and
large shows the results already discussed for the decision of co-working. Intra-firm trust prob-
lems (H4) as well as an involvement of other family members (H9) increase the number of hours
worked in the family business. In contrary to the effects found in the first model, an investment
of the companion does not lead to an higher extent of co-working (H8). Although firm size does
not contribute to the explanation of co-working itself, it has effects on the extent of collabora-
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tion. Obviously, there are more possibilities in larger firms as well as a higher need for co-
working of the companion. There is not always enough to do in a small business and the central
task of monitoring employees is less important. Finally, occupations which require to run a shop
with regular opening hours show a higher extent of co-working than painters and varnishers.
5 Conclusion
Taken together, our results can serve as evidence for the importance of the multiplex character
of matches between self-employed and their companions. The theoretical framework, which
highlights problems of trust and the necessity of governance mechanisms for this partnership,
finds support in the data presented. The social capital provided by the companion cannot be
transferred into economic benefits without an appropriate extent of trust concerning the stability
of the private relationship. Moreover it becomes evident that, in contrast to our presumptions in
the beginning, the allocation of the companion’s manpower is not determined mainly by individ-
ual pecuniary motives. Economic determinants like the productivity of the companion or sunk
costs by investments in human capital show effects which seem to be inconsistent with labor
market and human capital theories. 
Instead there are two crucial factors which help to understand the decision for collaboration of
the companions. First, the family and the household situation have strong effects on internal co-
working. A long-lasting private partnership and marriage enhance involvement of the companion
in the firm by providing trust and foster specific investments by the actors. Moreover, the
flexibility to work for a family business reduces future conflicts as can be seen in the case of
children: Whereas motherhood usually reduces women’s activities in the labor market, children
show no effect on the extent of internal co-working. However, there is still a trade-off between
household labor and co-working which is obviously not softened by assigning paid domestic
service in these households. Second, the characteristics of the entrepreneur’s business have
considerable effects on the decision of co-working. Strong support can be found for the hypothe-
sis that co-working increases when intra-firm problems of trust become larger. Many monitoring
problems in the firm of the self-employed enhance the probability as well as the extent of co-
working. 
However, these findings are not representative and rely on an explorative research design. This
implies some restrictions concerning the measurement, the available variables as well as the
generalization of the results. Generally speaking, a broader population as well as a larger sample
combined with even more effort to raise the net response rate seem necessary to provide a
profound basis for more elaborate analyses. Other regional settings and other occupations of the
self-employed should also contribute to the stabilization of these explorative results. Further
research is needed indeed.
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